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We examine an economy whose consumers have different discount
factors for utility, possibly not exponential. We characterize the prop-
erties of efficient allocations of resources and of the shadow prices
that would decentralize such allocations. We show in particular that
the representative agent has a decreasing discount rate when, as is
usually posited, all of a group’s members have a constant discount
rate and decreasing absolute risk aversion preferences. We also identify
conditions that lead the representative agent to have a rate of im-
patience that decreases with gross domestic product per capita.
I. Introduction
Time preferences determine individual saving and investment decisions,
which are among the most important choices made by economic agents.
Following Ramsey (1928) and Samuelson (1937), such decisions are
usually represented by assuming that consumers maximize the dis-
counted value of their flow of utility, using a constant rate of impatience.
We identify the conditions under which the preferences of the repre-
sentative agent of a group of consumers also maximize discounted utility.
We acknowledge helpful comments by two anonymous referees, our editor Nancy Stokey,
Amy Finkelstein, James Poterba, Franc¸ois Salanie´, Nicolas Treich, and the seminar par-
ticipants at Toulouse, Harvard, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology for helpful
comments. Several discussions with Rose-Anne Dana were very useful to help us solve
some technical aspects of the paper.
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We also link the rate of impatience of the representative agent to the
distribution of impatience rates in the population.
Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) survey several at-
tempts to estimate individuals’ discount rates. Rates differ dramatically
across studies, and within studies across individuals. There is no con-
vergence toward an agreed-on or unique rate of impatience. For ex-
ample, Warner and Pleeter (2001) found that individual discount rates
vary between 0 and 70 percent per year. As suggested, for example, by
Rader (1981), Jouini and Napp (2003), and Lengwiler (2004), there is
no reason to believe that different consumers have identical time pref-
erences for utility streams. This raises the question of the aggregation
of heterogeneous time preferences. To examine this question, we con-
sider a simple model in which each agent in a group maximizes a time-
additive lifetime utility. The discount rate is heterogeneous across the
population, and it may depend on either the time of receipt (hyperbolic
discounting) or current consumption. Agents may also have different
instantaneous utility functions. We assume that the group is able to
allocate consumption within the group in a Pareto-efficient way. That
is, we posit an exchange economy in which there is a cake to be shared
at each moment, what might be labeled the multiple-cakes problem.
We first show that the behavior of the group toward time can be du-
plicated by a representative agent whose lifetime utility functional is also
time-additive. Rubinstein (1974) also examined the question of aggre-
gating heterogeneous rates of impatience, but he derives a solution only
for a two-period model and for exponential and logarithmic utility
functions.
One of our key findings is that if individuals have heterogeneous
constant rates of impatience, the representative agent will not in general
use a constant rate to discount the future, as Becker (1992) first ob-
served. More precisely, if individuals have decreasing absolute risk aver-
sion (DARA), as would seem reasonable, then the representative agent
will have a declining discount rate. We call this declining discounting.
In short, heterogeneous individual exponential discounting yields a collective
discount rate that decreases with the time horizon. Under some realistic cal-
ibrations of the economy, the collective discount factor duplicates either
the hyperbolic case discussed by Loewenstein and Prelec (1991) or its
simplified beta-delta version (Laibson 1997).
The cornerstone of our result is that individuals will appropriately
change the share of resources each gets over time, so as to equalize
individual intertemporal marginal rates of substitution. This allows us
to define the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution of the rep-
resentative agent, which will equal the interest rate in a market setting.
Obviously, it is Pareto-efficient for the more impatient members to re-
ceive a larger share of the period’s cake early in life, a share that will
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decrease with time. However, this desire for an unequal and varying
distribution of the cake over time is limited by the limited agents’ tol-
erance for consumption fluctuations. An individual’s preference for
smoothness is measured by the concavity of her utility function. As shown
by Wilson (1968) and Constantinides (1982), it is helpful to use the
notion of (absolute) tolerance for consumption fluctuations over time.
If denotes the utility function of an agent, her tolerance for fluc-u(7)
tuations is measured by . This index vitally character-′ ′′T(7)p u (7)/u (7)
izes the allocation of the aggregate income when it varies over time.
Pareto efficiency demands that more tolerant agents bear a larger share
of fluctuations of the aggregate income.
Uncertainty plays no role in our analysis; variability in income does.
Turning to pure time preferences, we show that the rate of impatience
of the representative agent equals a weighted mean of individual rates
of impatience. These weights are proportional to the individual toler-
ances for consumption fluctuations. This is intuitive. The group’s rate
of impatience determines the group’s willingness to transfer aggregate
consumption across time. Only those members who are impatient and
have a large tolerance for consumption fluctuations want such transfers.
An impatient agent with a zero tolerance for fluctuations favors a smooth
consumption plan. As a result, when aggregating individual consump-
tion plans, the representative agent will have a rate of impatience that
is biased in favor of the rates of impatience of the more tolerant mem-
bers. Except for exponential utility functions, the weights in computing
the weighted mean of individual discount rates will evolve over time.
Given this, we show how the collective discount rate relates to both the
time horizon and the aggregate income in the economy.
II. The Model
We consider a cohort or a group of heterogeneous agents indexed by
. Each member consumes a single commodity in continuousip 1, … , I
time from date 0 to date N. The natural commodity space is the space
of functions that are bounded almost everywhere. Agent i’s prefer-L
ence order over alternative consumption plans is described by a smooth
lifetime utility function defined on the commodity space.i V : L r R
We assume that is time-additive:1iV
N
i iV (C)p u (C(t), t)dt,
0
1 Following Koopmans (1960), time additivity can be derived from the independence
axiom stating that if two intertemporal prospects share a common outcome at a given
date, then preference between them is determined solely by the remaining outcomes that
differ.
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where is the agent’s consumption level at date t, and isiC(t) u (C, t)
interpreted as the discounted felicity extracted by agent i consuming C
at time t. We assume that is continuous with respect to t and threeiu
times differentiable, increasing, and concave with respect to C. We also
assume the Inada condition for all t. The group isilim u (C, t)p Cr0 c
endowed with a flow of the single consumption good. Forz : [0, N ] r R
simplicity, this collective endowment is risk-free. Finally, is boundedz(t)
below by and above by for all .¯z 1 0 z !  t  [0, N ]
An allocation is characterized by a vector of consumption profiles
determining the consumption of agent i at date t. AniC : [0, N ] r R
allocation is feasible if at each instant of time aggregate consumption
equals aggregate income. The only restriction that we impose on the
cohort’s division of the cakes across periods is that it be Pareto-efficient.
An allocation is Pareto-efficient if it is feasible and if there is no other
feasible allocation that raises the lifetime utility of at least one type
without reducing the lifetime utility of the other types. To any such
efficient allocation, there exists a weight vector such1 Ilp (l , … , l ) 1 0
that it is the solution of the group’s following maximization problem:
I
i i iV (z)p max lV (C )l
1 I ip1C ,…,C
I
isubject to C (t)p z(t) Gt  [0, N ]. (1)
ip1
The reason why this variational problem expresses Pareto efficiency is
well known. The locus of individuals’ lifetime utilities obtained from
feasible allocations is a convex set. It implies that, to every Pareto-effi-
cient allocation, there exists a hyperplane characterized by 1(l , … ,
that is tangent to this set. Because the set of feasible utility payoffsIl )
is closed under our assumptions,2 a solution to program (1) exists.
The term can be interpreted as the lifetime utility of the repre-Vl
sentative agent consuming the flow of aggregate wealth z. In the classic
analysis of the static syndicate problem, Wilson (1968) and Constantini-
des (1982) considered a decision problem that bears parallels to (1).
Wilson examined a decision under uncertainty for expected-utility max-
imizers with heterogeneous utility functions and heterogeneous beliefs.
He examined a group whose members have differing utility functions
and beliefs, which in turn provide the bases for their individual expected
utilities. The group’s goal is to choose one among a set of lotteries and
2 When consumption plans are not restricted to be bounded, the set U of all feasible
utility levels of the economy may not be closed, as observed by Araujo (1985), Mas-Colell
(1986), and Aliprantis, Brown, and Burkinshaw (1990). A proof of the closedness of U
under our assumptions is available on request.
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then define a sharing rule for the monetary outcome so as to produce
Pareto optimality. Using the additivity property of the expected utility
model, Wilson proved that the optimal collective decision policy is iso-
morphic to the optimal decision policy of a representative agent who
also maximizes the expected value of a concave function of consumption
per capita in the cohort (see also Constantinides 1982). The existence
of a representative agent with such simple aggregative properties has
become a cornerstone of theories in finance and macroeconomics. The
following proposition presents an equivalent result in our model with
time-additive preferences. Its simple proof by contradiction is left to the
reader.
Proposition 1. Representative agent.—Suppose that the set of all
feasible utility levels is closed and that the group allocates wealth effi-
ciently over time according to the vector of positive1 Ilp (l , … , l )
Pareto weights. In association with this vector, there exists a represen-
tative agent with a time-additive lifetime utility functional V (z)pl
. The representative agent’s felicity functionN ¯v(z(t), t)dt v : [z, z]# [0,∫0
is defined byN ] r R
I
i i iv(z, t)p max lu (c , t)
1 I ip1c ,…,c
I
isubject to c p z. (2)
ip1
The associated efficient allocation is characterized by i iC (t)p c (z(t), t)
for all and .t  [0, N ] ip 1, … , I
It is noteworthy that the function v depends on the distribution of
Pareto weights l. Proposition 1 enables us to decompose the multiperiod
maximization program (1) into a sequence of static maximization pro-
grams (2). The time additivity of individual preference functionals is,
of course, essential to get this result. Notice that the cake-sharing prob-
lem (2) has two parameters: the size of the cake z and the time t at
which this cake is available. Its solution is therefore a function1 N(c , … , c )
of (z, t). By proposition 1, the optimal solution of the1 N(C , … , C )
intertemporal problem is such that for all t and i.i iC (t)p c (z(t), t)
By the concavity of with respect to its first argument, the solutioniu
to program (2) is unique. Its first-order condition is written as
i i ilu (c (z, t), t)p w(z, t), (3)c
for all (z, t) and i, where w is the Lagrange multiplier of the feasibility
constraint associated with time t and average endowment z. By the en-
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velope theorem, the marginal value of wealth at time t is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with time t. Thus we have that
v (z, t)p w(z, t) G(z, t). (4)z
By writing , we have disentangled the two impactsi iC (t)p c (z(t), t)
that time has on the efficient sharing of wealth. First, because time
affects the marginal utility of every agent in the group, it is likely to
affect the efficient sharing of wealth. Second, aggregate wealth changes
over time, and individual consumption levels must reflect that. In the
following proposition, we summarize the standard results describing the
effect of a change in wealth at date t on the efficient allocation and on
the marginal value of wealth at that date. Notice that i iT (c, t)p u (c,c
denotes the absolute tolerance for consumption fluctuationsit)/u (c, t)cc
of agent i.
Proposition 2. Tolerance for consumption fluctuations.—The marginal
propensity to consume out of aggregate wealth of an agent is propor-
tional to this agent’s tolerance for consumption fluctuations:
i iT (c (z, t), t)ic (z, t)p . (5)z I j j T (c (z, t), t)jp1
Moreover, the group’s absolute tolerance for aggregate consumption
fluctuations is the sum of its members’ tolerances:
Iv (z, t)zv j jT (z, t)p  p T (c (z, t), t). (6)def v (z, t) jp1zz
Proof. See, for example, Wilson (1968). QED
This proposition states in (5) that more tolerant agents have larger
marginal propensities to consume. It is intuitively appealing that people
who are more tolerant of consumption fluctuations should receive a
larger share of aggregate fluctuations. All consumption levels are pro-
cyclical, but some are more procyclical than others. This result allows
us to measure the group’s tolerance for aggregate fluctuations, which
is just the sum of the members’ tolerances.
III. The Group’s Rate of Impatience
In the classic case with homogeneous exponential discount factors, in-
dividuals’ consumption levels vary only with fluctuations in the aggregate
endowment . When discount rates are heterogeneous, by contrast,z(7)
time enters as an additional factor. We examine the partial derivative
of individual consumption levels with respect to time. When the average
income z remains constant over time, it is intuitive that less patient
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people will trade later consumption for earlier consumption with those
who are more patient. The impatient ones will have a decreasing con-
sumption path, and vice versa.
The instantaneous rate of pure time preference of agent i consuming
c at time t equals
iu (c, t)ctid(c, t)p  . (7)iu (c, t)c
It measures the rate at which marginal utility decreases with time when
consumption is held constant. The classic discounted utility model as-
sumes that di is independent of (c, t). In the case of hyperbolic dis-
counting, d is independent of c but decreases with t. Given that a non-
constant d raises a consistency problem, we assume that agents can
commit to their future consumption plan at date .tp 0
Given the feasibility constraint, it must be that
I
ic (z, t)p 0. (8) t
ip1
When the aggregate wealth remains constant over time, increases in
consumption by some members of the group must be compensated by
equivalent reductions to others. Fully differentiating the first-order con-
dition (3) yields
i i i i i i ilu (c , t) lu (c , t)c p w,ct cc t t
for all (z, t). Using (3) to eliminate the Lagrange multiplier , we canil
rewrite the above equality as
wti i i i 1 id(c , t) [T (c , t)] c pt
w
or, equivalently,
wti i i i ic p T (c , t)  d(c , t) . (9)t [ ]w
Replacing in (8) by its expression from (9) yieldsict
I i i i i d(c (z, t), t)T (c (z, t), t)ip1wtp  . (10)I i iw  T (c (z, t), t)ip1
Proposition 3 characterizes the time profile of individual consumption
plans when people have heterogeneous discount rates. It flows from
properties (9) and (10).
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Proposition 3. Individual consumption path.—The increase in con-
sumption through time of an agent is decreasing in that agent’s discount
rate :id
i i i v i ic (z, t)p T (c (z, t), t)[d (z, t) d(c (z, t), t)], (11)t
with
I i i i i d(c (z, t), t)T (c (z, t), t)ip1
vd (z, t)p . (12)I i i T (c (z, t), t)ip1
The individual consumption path proposition determines how more
patient people should substitute current consumption for future con-
sumption. Notice that the consumption path of agent i increases locally
in t if and only if her rate of impatience is smaller than the weighted
mean of individual rates of impatience, where is the effective pre-v vd d
vailing interest rate within the economy. More patient members post-
pone their consumption to the future in exchange for a positive return
on their savings. Because both d and are functions of z and t, efficientvd
consumption profiles need not be monotone. In technical terms, prop-
osition 3 requires that the change in individual consumption be in-
creasing in when agents have the same tolerance for consumptionid
fluctuations. The following corollary, which is a direct consequence of
equation (11), exhibits the weaker property of single crossing.
Corollary 1. Single-crossing property.—Suppose that agents have the
same tolerance for consumption fluctuations: for alliT (c, t)p T(c, t)
(c, t). Suppose that there exist two agents i and j such that id(c, t) 1
for all (c, t). This implies thatjd (c, t)
i j i jc (z*, t)p c (z*, t) ⇒ c (z*, t) ≤ c (z*, t).t t
We can now turn to the central aim of this paper, which is to
characterize the aggregation of individual discount rates. Impatience
flows from the fact that, seen from , the marginal value of antp 0
increase in consumption decreases with the time at which it takes
place. The impatience characterizing the group’s preferences can be
made more explicit by defining the group’s instantaneous rate of
impatience as
v (z, t) w(z, t)zt t p  . (13)
v (z, t) w(z, t)z
Combining conditions (13) and (10) yields the following result.
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Proposition 4. Collective impatience.—The instantaneous rate of
pure preference for the present of the representative agent defined by
(13) is a weighted mean of individual members’ instantaneous rates:
I i i i i d(c (z, t), t)T (c (z, t), t)ip1v (z, t)zt v p d (z, t)p . (14)I i iv (z, t)  T (c (z, t), t)z ip1
Not surprisingly, the (implicit) psychological discount rate of the rep-
resentative agent is a weighted mean of the individual rates of impa-
tience in the cohort. The weights are proportional to the corresponding
individual tolerances for consumption fluctuations. This weighting of
the mean of is intuitive. When considering its attitude toward post-id
poning aggregate incomes, the group must take into account the rate
of impatience of those members who will have to postpone their con-
sumption. As seen from equation (11), these will be the ones who have
a larger tolerance for consumption fluctuations. This is why the collec-
tive rate of impatience is biased in favor of the rates of impatience of
more tolerant members. To illustrate, consider a cohort with two agents.
Agent h has a high discount rate and is somewhat tolerant of con-hd
sumption fluctuations. Agent l, by contrast, has a lower discount rate dl
but has a zero tolerance for consumption fluctuations. Despite his pa-
tience, agent 2 will prefer to smooth his consumption completely. There-
fore, agent 1 will bear the entire burden of aggregate fluctuations. The
cohort’s attitude toward time is therefore determined entirely by agent
1’s preferences. In particular, the cohort’s degree of impatience will be
the larger dh.
IV. The Term Structure of the Group’s Rate of Impatience
As a direct consequence of the fact that is a weighted mean, it isvd
bounded below and above by the smallest and largest individual rates
of impatience:
i i v i imin d(c (z, t), t) ≤ d (z, t) ≤ max d(c (z, t), t).
ip1,…,I ip1,…,I
It is important to notice that the weights in equation (14) are aiT
function of both z and t. Thus, even if the individual discount rates id
are independent of consumption and time, it is generally not true that
is independent of these variables. We now examine the term structurevd
of the collective rate of impatience.
Suppose that all are independent of c and t; that is, the group’sid
members discount the flow of future felicity exponentially: iu (c, t)pc
, where measures the felicity of agent i consuming c.i i iexp (d t)h (c) h (c)
The problem here is to determine whether the cohort as a whole should
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use exponential discounting when all its members use exponential dis-
counting. When all members have the same discount rate, discounting
at that rate is appropriate. With heterogeneous discount rates, fully
differentiating condition
I i i i dT (c (z, t), t)ip1
vd (z, t)p I i i T (c (z, t), t)ip1
with respect to t and using condition (11) yields
2I I Ii i i i i i i i dT T  dT  d T Tc cip1 ip1 ip1
vd (z, t)p 2 t I I I( ) ( ) ( )i i i T  T  Tip1 ip1 ip1
I 2 Ii i i i dT  T Tcip1 ip1
 , (15)I I( ) ( )i i T  Tip1 ip1
where and are evaluated at .i i iT T (c (z, t), t)c
Proposition 5. Hyperbolic collective impatience.—Suppose that every
agent has a multiplicatively separable utility function with an exponen-
tial discount: . The social rate of impatiencei i i vu (c, t)p exp (d t)h (c) d
is decreasing (increasing) in t if all felicity functions , ,ih ip 1, … , I
have an increasing (decreasing) tolerance for consumption fluctuations.
Proof. Consider a specific (z, t) and let and denote, respectively,i ix y
i iT (c (z, t))
j j T (c (z, t))j
and
i i i iT (c (z, t))T (c (z, t))c .
j j j j T (c (z, t))T (c (z, t))cj
Under the condition that all have a constant sign, we have that isi iT yc
nonnegative for every i and . Observe thati y p 1i
I I I 2 I 2
i i i i i i i i2 d x d y ≤ d x  d y . (16)   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ip1 ip1 ip1 ip1
Moreover, we know from Jensen’s inequality that
I 2 I
2i i i id y ≤ d y . (17) ( )
ip1 ip1
Obviously, combining (16) and (17) yields
I I I 2 I
2i i i i i i i i2 d x d y ≤ d x  d y .   ( ) ( ) ( )
ip1 ip1 ip1 ip1
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From equation(15), this is equivalent to
I i i T (c (z, t))ip1
vd (z, t) ≤ 0.t I i i i i T (c (z, t))T (c (z, t))cip1
It implies that and have opposite signs. QEDv id Tt c
To borrow standard terminology from the economics of uncertainty,
increasing tolerance for fluctuations means that absolute risk aversion
is decreasing (DARA), the traditional assumption. Notice that we do
not assume any correlation between rates of impatience and degrees of
tolerance for fluctuations. The monotonicity of these degrees of tol-
erance is the only thing that matters for the slope of the term structure
of . Simple intuition supports this important result. From equationvd
(11), we know that more patient consumers have an increasing con-
sumption profile. Under DARA, their tolerance for consumption fluc-
tuations increases through time. This implies that when time goes for-
ward, consumers with a low d see their weight growing in the mean
. This implies that the social rate of impatience decreases withvd (z, t)
time. In the rest of this section, we present a few illustrations of this
result.
Our first illustration involves two agents with respective constant rates
of impatience and . The two agents have the same felicity func-l h ld d 1 d
tion , with . This function is piece-h(c)p min [b(c a), d(c a)] 0 ! d ! b
wise linear with a kink at . We consider the case in which b tendscp a
to infinity, which means that the left branch of the curve becomes ver-
tical. Parameter a is the minimum level of subsistence. On the relevant
domain [a, [ of this limit function, agents have a nondecreasing
tolerance (DARA), with a zero tolerance at and an infinite tol-cp a
erance for all . We assume that the flow of aggregate incomes isc 1 a
uniformly larger than 2a in order to guarantee a bounded value func-
tion. In this economy, any Pareto-efficient sharing of the cake produces
a consumption pattern that flip-flops from subsistence to surplus, or
vice versa. The patient agent enjoys the first path and the impatient
agent the second. As a consequence, the social rate of impatience
equals prior to and thereafter. The term structure isv h ld (z, t) d tp t d
a simple downward step function in this case, a special case of hyperbolic
discounting that is often referred to as the “beta-delta” model. Phelps
and Pollak (1968), then followed by Laibson (1997) and many others
afterward, introduced this stepwise functional form to describe observed
psychological discount rates.
This discounting functional would emerge as the socially efficient rule
for less extreme examples. Let us replace the piecewise-linear felicity
function by a power felicity function. The two agents have the same
constant relative risk aversion g. Under the efficient allocation of re-
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Fig. 1.—The discount rate as a function of time horizon for two agents with hd p 0.2
and when .l i 0.9d p 0.05 h (c)p c
sources with and , the group’s discount rate as a wholel l h hl p d l p d
can be written as
l hl (1g)/g d t/g h (1g)/g d t/g(d ) e  (d ) evd (z, t)p . (18)l hl 1/g d t/g h 1/g d t/g(d ) e  (d ) e
When g tends to zero, this function of t tends to a downward step
function with step levels at and . The step occurs at time horizonh ld d
. In figure 1, we draw this function forh l h lt*p [ln (d ) ln (d )]/(d  d )
percent, percent, and .h ld p 20 d p 5 gp 0.1
These two examples provide additional insights as to why the social
rate of impatience should be decreasing. Consider in particular example
2, which is illustrated by figure 1. Consider a marginal investment by
the cohort that would move some of the cohort’s income from time t
to . If t is small, this change in the structure of the cash flows willt Dt
mostly benefit the impatient agent. It is then intuitive that the social
planner uses the (high) rate of impatience of these agents when per-
forming the cost-benefit analysis of this investment project. On the con-
trary, for an investment project moving some of the cohort’s income
from a larger time t to , it will be the more patient members whot Dt
will benefit primarily from this change, because they consume the larger
share of the cake at those time horizons. As anticipated by Becker (1992,
example 3), the social planner will thus use their smaller rate of im-
patience to perform the cost-benefit analysis of this alternative invest-
ment project. In short, the social planner will use a rate of impatience
that is decreasing with the time horizon from to .h ld d
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Fig. 2.—The collective rate of impatience dv as a function of time when , ,gp 2 hp 1
and percent.mp 5
Our last example is interesting because it generates a functional form
for the social discount rate that fits some of those that already exist in
the literature. Suppose as above that all agents have the same constant
relative risk aversion g. There is a continuum of agents who discount
their flow of felicity exponentially. Agents are indexed by their rate of
impatience d. Suppose, moreover, that individual discount rates d are
distributed following a negative exponential law with density f(d)p
on support [0, ]. The mean rate of impatience in the popu-d/me /m
lation equals m. We consider the Pareto-efficient allocation that corre-
sponds to the weighting function for some . In thisl(d)p d/h h 1 0
illustration, it can be verified that
h gvd (z, t)p , (19)
t (g/m)
which is independent of z. When relative risk aversion g tends to infinity,
tends to m uniformly for all t. When g tends to zero, tendsv vd d (z, t)
uniformly to h. In figure 2, we draw the discount rate as a functionvd
of time. As seen in (19), the collective discount rate declines with time
t as . The discount factor can be written as1/[t (g/m)]
t (hg)mtvb(t)p  exp d (z, t)dt p 1 . ( )[ ] g0
This is the functional form suggested by Loewenstein and Prelec (1991),
who generalized earlier proposals made by Herrnstein (1981) and Ma-
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Fig. 3.—Efficient consumption path for agents with different discount rates d, with
, , and percent.gp 2 hp 1 mp 5
zur (1987). It is useful to examine how consumption is allocated in this
economy. The set of first-order conditions (3) combined with the fea-
sibility constraints can be solved analytically to yield
(gh)/gmz t 1
d h/g dt/gc (z, t)p  d e , (20)( )G((g h)/g) g m
where is the gamma function. In figure 3, we drawx1 dG(x)p d e dd∫0
the efficient consumption plan for a few agents when the mean income
in the population remains constant over time and is normalized to unity.
We see again what drives the declining term structure of the collective
discount rate: At , individual consumption levels and individualtp 0
degrees of tolerance are positively related to the individual rates of
impatience. This weighting leads to a social rate of impatience that is
greater than m, the mean rate of impatience in the economy. As time
goes forward, most resources go to those with low discount rates, and
the social rate of impatience falls below m. Notice that, following con-
dition (11), the consumption profile of agent d is locally increasing as
long as d is less than . Because is decreasing in t, consumptionv vd (z, t) d
profiles of all agents with a rate of impatience d less than vd (z,
percent are hump-shaped; by contrast, those agents with a rate0)  7.5
of impatience greater than 7.5 percent have decreasing consumption
throughout. In general, efficient consumption profiles are either de-
creasing or hump-shaped under the assumptions of proposition 5.
In this section, we assumed throughout that all agents discount their
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flow of felicity at a constant rate, and we obtained that the representative
agent will discount at a decreasing rate. As is intuitive, the same result
remains true if all individual discount rates are decreasing. The following
corollary is a simple extension of proposition 5, and its proof is left to
the reader.
Corollary 2. Suppose that agents have multiplicatively separable
utility functions with hyperbolic discounting:
i i iu (c, t)p exp [d(t)t]h (c)
and for all . Then the term structure of the collectiveid ≤ 0 ip 1, … , It
rate of impatience is decreasing if all utility functions exhibit DARA.v id h
V. A Wealth Effect on the Group’s Impatience
In the standard model of consumption, saving, and growth, rates of
impatience are assumed to be independent of consumption levels:
. However, it is often observed that wealthier economies are moreid p 0c
patient, understanding that causality can flow in either direction. In our
notation, this implies that is decreasing in z. In this section, we ex-vd
amine whether these two assumptions can be compatible.
Observe that we found that is independent of z in our three ex-vd
amples. These examples illustrate the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Suppose that, for all , is multipli-iip 1, … , I u
catively separable: . The following conditions arei i iu (c, t)p b (t)h (c)
equivalent: (1) For any distribution of individual discount factors and
of Pareto weights, the collective rate of impatience is independent of
the consumption per capita z. (2) All consumers have identical-slope
harmonic absolute risk aversion (ISHARA) preferences: ih (c)p [(c
.i 1ga )/g]
Proof. Consider a specific (z, t) and let denoteix
i iT (c (z, t))
.
j j T (c (z, t))j
Fully differentiating equation (14) with respect to z and using property
(5) yields
I I I I
i v i i i i i i iT (c(z, t)) d (z, t)p x d(t)T (c(z, t)) x d(t) x T (c(z, t)) .   z c c[ ] [ ][ ]
ip1 ip1 ip1 ip1
(21)
The right-hand side of this equality can be interpreted as the covariance
between d and . For ISHARA preferences, is a constant, whichiT Tc c
implies that the covariance is zero. When is not a constant, it is alwaysTc
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possible to find a counterexample; that is, the consumption level affects
discount rates. QED
Rubinstein (1974) obtained the same wealth irrelevancy property in
the special case of exponential and logarithmic utility functions. The
family of ISHARA preferences is characterized by the property that the
derivatives of individual absolute tolerances are a constant across agents.
Except in that case, the representative agent need not have a multipli-
catively separable utility function. An illustration is given in the following
proposition, which assumes that the are heterogeneous in the pop-iTc
ulation and that they are correlated with individual rates of impatience.
In such a situation, the social rate of impatience is sensitive to the
aggregate wealth in the economy.
Proposition 7. Suppose that the members of the group have a
rate of impatience that is independent of their consumption: .id p 0c
Suppose also that their tolerance for fluctuations is linear with respect
to their consumption: . The collective rate of impatience at t williT p 0cc
be decreasing with the aggregate income if and evaluated at t arei id Tc
anti-comonotone: for all , .i j i ii, j [d(c, t) d (c, t)][T (c, t) T (c, t)] ≤ 0c c
Proof. It is a direct consequence of (21). QED
Simple intuition supports the result. It flows from the fact that the
collective rate of impatience is a weighted mean of individual rates of
impatience. When and are anti-comonotone, an increase in wealthi id Tc
differentially increases the weights associated with the lower rates of
impatience. An increase in z then pushes downward.vd
To illustrate, consider an economy with two agents. Rates of impa-
tience are constant, hence independent of time and consumption levels.
The first agent has a low impatience rate, percent, and a loga-ld p 5
rithmic felicity function, which implies that . The secondlT (c, t){ 1c
agent has a larger rate of impatience, precent, and a constanthd p 20
relative risk aversion , which implies that . Observeh hg p 10 T (c, t){ 0.1c
that the conditions of proposition 7 are satisfied in this example. We
derived numerically the Pareto-efficient allocation corresponding to
equal Pareto weights . Figure 4 shows the term structure of thel hl p l
collective rate of impatience when the aggregate wealth is constant over
time and equals either 0.5, 1, or 2. We see that a larger per capita
consumption yields a smaller rate of impatience for all time horizons.
VI. Conclusion
It is well known that a group does not or cannot make decisions under
certainty in the same manner as individuals. This paper demonstrates
that a group will also not treat the same time value of rewards the same
way as individual consumers do, even when all consumers are expo-
nential discounters with identical felicity functions. For example, the
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Fig. 4.—Term structure of the collective rate of impatience when andl 0.05t 1u (c, t)p e cc
.h 0.2t 10u (c, t)p e cc
group’s rate of impatience may well depend on the group’s wealth level.
Despite this, the basic property of additivity of individual preferences
is transmitted to the preferences of the representative agent. This im-
plies that the representative agent of the group has no consumption
habits and no anticipatory feelings if its members do not also have such
psychological traits.
The main objective of the paper was to identify the appropriate mech-
anism to aggregate heterogeneous time preferences. That mechanism
has a collective rate of impatience at any moment that is a weighted
mean of the members’ local rates of impatience. Each member’s weight
is proportional to her degree of absolute tolerance for consumption
fluctuations. This aggregation rule implies that the collective rate of
impatience is decreasing with respect to the time horizon when wealthier
consumers are less averse to consumption fluctuations, a common as-
sumption. This reasoning presupposes, of course, that the group is able
to redistribute consumption within the group in response to each
agent’s degree of impatience. For long horizons, any transfer of the
group’s wealth across time will mostly affect the more patient agents
because they are the ones who have the largest stake on aggregate
wealth. Thus, when considering investments affecting cash flows cor-
responding to these long horizons, the group should use the lower rate
of impatience in the group for cost-benefit analysis. On the contrary,
for short time horizons, transferring wealth across time affects mainly
the consumption flow of the more impatient agents. In the collective
heterogeneous time preferences 895
cost-benefit analysis for such investments, the larger rate of impatience
of these agents should be employed.
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